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title: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to...
description: Researchers found flaws in Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs) that let attackers roll back a fTPM's lockout state and brute-force Windows Hello PINs....
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og:description: Researchers found flaws in Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs) that let attackers roll back a fTPM's lockout state and brute-force Windows Hello PINs....
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# Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs

**[Hacker News](https://daily.dev/sources/hn)** · 3 min read · 1 upvotes · 0 comments

## Summary

Researchers found flaws in Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs) that let attackers roll back a fTPM's lockout state and brute-force Windows Hello PINs. Winbond SPI flash, which holds over 25% of the NOR flash market, leaks its HMAC key under voltage glitching, allowing arbitrary counter forgery. AMD's NV controller fails to verify RPMC increments, letting an interposer suppress them undetected, and two AMD desktops reset their fTPM lockout counters simply by reflashing an old image. Using low-cost interposer hardware, the team cracked a 4-digit PIN in 40 hours instead of 69 days, and defeated BitLocker's TPM+PIN protector, cutting the worst-case time for a 6-digit PIN from 19 years to 20 days.

## Full article

daily.dev links to this article rather than hosting it. Read it at the original source: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126>

## Questions this post answers

### How long does it take to brute-force a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN by exploiting TPM rollback protection flaws?

It takes about 40 hours instead of the expected 69 days. Researchers exploited flaws in Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs) used by firmware TPMs to enforce lockout state, using low-cost interposer hardware to roll back the lockout counter and repeatedly retry PINs on locked, encrypted hardware.

_Developers tracking TPM and PIN authentication security can follow this research on daily.dev._

### Can BitLocker's TPM+PIN protection be bypassed using a TPM counter rollback attack?

Yes, the same rollback primitive that defeats Windows Hello PIN lockouts also defeats BitLocker's TPM+PIN pre-boot protector. It reduces the worst-case brute-force time for a default-length 6-digit PIN from 19 years down to 20 days, by resetting the TPM's lockout counters via flaws in RPMC implementations.

_Anyone evaluating BitLocker's PIN protections can keep up with findings like this on daily.dev._

### Why is Winbond SPI flash vulnerable to counter forgery attacks on TPM lockout state?

Winbond SPI flash, the leading NOR flash vendor with over 25% market share, leaks its HMAC key under voltage glitching. Since the Replay Protected Monotonic Counter mechanism relies on that HMAC key to authenticate counter values, leaking it enables arbitrary counter forgery, undermining the rollback protection meant to secure TPM lockout state.

_Firmware security engineers assessing flash vendor risk can track hardware vulnerability research on daily.dev._

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---

Tags: [#security](https://daily.dev/tags/security)

[View this post on daily.dev](https://daily.dev/posts/exploiting-replay-protected-monotonic-counters-to-brute-force-windows-hello-pins-y4usauq0s)

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