FortiGuard Labs details a real-world attack chain where the Shai Hulud supply chain worm (attributed to TeamPCP, targeting npm/PyPI packages) compromised a Jenkins CI/CD runner in May 2026, leading to full AWS account takeover and Amazon Redshift data exfiltration. The attacker stole EC2 instance metadata credentials, used them externally to escalate IAM privileges by creating a rogue 'cloudops-monitor' admin user, manipulated Aurora RDS and Redshift security groups, enumerated Secrets Manager for warehouse credentials, and ran ~90 Redshift Data API query cycles to exfiltrate data. Exfiltration tradecraft included explicitly named IAM policies (exfil-s3-write, exfil-s3-full) and STS session names (exfil, exfil10, exfil12). FortiCNAPP generated 1,095 observations correlated under a single 'Potentially Compromised Keys' alert. Defenders are advised to treat CI/CD runners as tier-0 identities, alert on external instance credential use, guard datastore control planes, and hunt attacker-named IAM artifacts.
