--- title: From "Trust Me" to "Verify Me" - Tom van den Berg - NDC... description: A conference talk covering software supply chain security, moving from implicit trust to verifiable claims. Key topics include artifact signing with cosign and... canonical: https://daily.dev/posts/from-trust-me-to-verify-me---tom-van-den-berg---ndc-copenhagen-2026-kgzupjtj3 twitter:card: summary_large_image twitter:site: @dailydotdev og:type: website og:site_name: daily.dev og:title: From "Trust Me" to "Verify Me" - Tom van den Berg - NDC Copenhagen 2026 | daily.dev og:description: A conference talk covering software supply chain security, moving from implicit trust to verifiable claims. Key topics include artifact signing with cosign and... og:url: https://daily.dev/posts/from-trust-me-to-verify-me---tom-van-den-berg---ndc-copenhagen-2026-kgzupjtj3 og:image: https://api.daily.dev/og/posts/kgZupJtJ3.png og:image:alt: From "Trust Me" to "Verify Me" - Tom van den Berg - NDC Copenhagen 2026 og:image:width: 1200 og:image:height: 630 og:locale: en --- > ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://daily.dev/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # From "Trust Me" to "Verify Me" - Tom van den Berg - NDC Copenhagen 2026 **[NDC Conferences](https://daily.dev/sources/ndc)** · 54 min read · 0 upvotes · 0 comments ## Summary A conference talk covering software supply chain security, moving from implicit trust to verifiable claims. Key topics include artifact signing with cosign and Fulcio, the SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) framework and its build levels, build provenance generation and attestations, the confused deputy attack via Dependabot, stale branch risks, and OCI artifact distribution using tools like ORAS. The talk also covers Docker hardened images with attached attestations, Open Policy Agent for deployment gatekeeping, and ends with a sobering note that the Shy Hulud supply chain attack successfully forged cryptographically valid SLSA level 3 provenance, showing the framework must continue to evolve. ## Full article daily.dev links to this article rather than hosting it. Read it at the original source: ## Questions this post answers ### What is the difference between signing a container image by tag vs by digest in cosign? Signing by tag is insecure because tags are mutable — an attacker can upload a different artifact under the same tag, invalidating the trust. Signing by digest (SHA-256 hash of the artifact content) is secure because the digest changes whenever the content changes, requiring a new signature. Digest-based signing creates a fully reproducible, verifiable artifact. _Teams shipping containers to production track signing best practices like this on daily.dev._ ### What SLSA level can Azure DevOps reach and why is it limited? Azure DevOps can only reach SLSA level 1. Microsoft's own SLSA demo for Azure DevOps explicitly states this limitation. To reach SLSA level 3, which requires authentic and unforgeable build provenance, a build platform like GitHub Actions must be used instead, as it claims to generate provenance meeting that standard. _Engineers choosing between CI/CD platforms for compliance requirements find comparisons like this on daily.dev._ ### What is the Dependabot confused deputy attack and how does it work? The confused deputy attack abuses Dependabot's trusted status in auto-merge workflows. An attacker forks a repo, injects malicious code, opens a pull request back to the original, then comments 'dependabot recreate' on that PR. Dependabot recreates the PR and changes its author to itself, causing auto-merge policies that trust Dependabot to approve and merge the malicious code without human review. _Developers maintaining open source repos or internal platforms stay ahead of CI/CD attack patterns on daily.dev._ ## Similar posts on daily.dev - [Software Supply Chain Security: Why 99% of Your Container is Mystery Code](https://daily.dev/posts/software-supply-chain-security-why-99-of-your-container-is-mystery-code-0o8ohjmsz) · Cloud Native Now · 0 upvotes · 0 comments - [Leading Open Source Author Calls for Verification over Trust in Software Supply Chains](https://daily.dev/posts/leading-open-source-author-calls-for-verification-over-trust-in-software-supply-chains-xli4eiofk) · InfoQ · 4 upvotes · 1 comments - [Supply chain robots, electric sheep, and SLSA](https://daily.dev/posts/supply-chain-robots-electric-sheep-and-slsa-crdz503is) · All Things Open · 0 upvotes · 0 comments --- Tags: [#security](https://daily.dev/tags/security) [View this post on daily.dev](https://daily.dev/posts/from-trust-me-to-verify-me---tom-van-den-berg---ndc-copenhagen-2026-kgzupjtj3) ```json {"@context":"https://schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https://daily.dev/#organization","name":"daily.dev","url":"https://daily.dev","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://daily.dev/apple-touch-icon.png","width":180,"height":180},"sameAs":["https://twitter.com/dailydotdev","https://github.com/dailydotdev","https://www.linkedin.com/company/daily-dev-ltd"]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https://daily.dev/#website","url":"https://daily.dev","name":"daily.dev","publisher":{"@id":"https://daily.dev/#organization"},"potentialAction":{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https://daily.dev/search?q={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}}]} {"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"TechArticle","headline":"From \"Trust Me\" to \"Verify Me\" - Tom van den Berg - NDC Copenhagen 2026","url":"https://daily.dev/posts/from-trust-me-to-verify-me---tom-van-den-berg---ndc-copenhagen-2026-kgzupjtj3","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://daily.dev/posts/from-trust-me-to-verify-me---tom-van-den-berg---ndc-copenhagen-2026-kgzupjtj3"},"datePublished":"2026-08-11T07:57:47.501Z","dateModified":"2026-08-11T07:58:14.976Z","description":"A conference talk covering software supply chain security, moving from implicit trust to verifiable claims. 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