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# Malicious code served through Optimizely hit nearly 190 sites, including CNN, the BBC and Zoom

**[Collections](https://daily.dev/sources/collections)** · 3 min read · 19 upvotes · 0 comments

## Summary

A malicious script injected through Optimizely's web experimentation platform hit visitors on 178 organizations' sites on November 16, 2026, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Researcher Scott Helme tracked the campaign, dubbed OPTIMJACK, and confirmed 186 sites. Attackers used Optimizely's Project JavaScript field to load a script from '1688360[.]cc/track.js' that swapped crypto wallet addresses, stole card numbers, copied cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads loaded iOS code that appears to include exploit kits. Of 256 affected hosts checked, 68 had no Content-Security-Policy at all and only 24 blocked the payload. The attacker's wallets received roughly $6,600 to $7,040, though some of that may predate this campaign.

## Content

On 16 November 2026, attackers used a hole in Optimizely's Experimentation account signup flow to push malicious JavaScript into customer projects. The code was served from Optimizely-hosted files to visitors of 178 organizations, among them Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock.

Security researcher Scott Helme checked 1,611 snippets and found 188 infected script files. Report URI's Threat Intelligence pipeline first flagged the activity at 15:06 UTC on a customer site, which started the investigation.

## What the script did

The loader is a single line that adds a script tag for `1688360[.]cc/track.js`. The payload then:

- swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses when a user copied one
- skimmed card numbers from checkout and other site forms
- copied cookies and took a page screenshot after a swap

On iPhones and iPads it also loaded two boot.js scripts from .icu hosts. On iOS 18.6 or earlier it added a hidden iframe. Helme says the malware includes the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. The authors of one analysis did not examine those exploits, and no iPhone takeover has been reported.

The operator was actively working on it, editing the payload four times in two hours and growing it from 28,877 to 30,430 bytes. The attacker's wallets received roughly $6,600 to $7,040 depending on the count, and some of that may predate this campaign.

## Cleanup

Optimizely blocked access to the vulnerable path and revoked tokens. By 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's file was still compromised, and Report URI said every infected file was clean by 23:11 UTC.

## Why CSP matters here

Most organizations review their server-side deployments carefully but load dynamic third-party scripts with no controls at all. Subresource Integrity and Content Security Policy exist for exactly this, and almost nobody uses them. SRI is awkward for scripts that change by design, but CSP can still help, even in Report-Only mode, which gives near-real-time visibility into script changes without risking breakage.

Helme tested CSP against 256 affected hosts, and the results were poor:

- 68 had no CSP at all
- 50 allowed both the payload and the data theft
- only 24 (15%) blocked the payload

A strict `script-src` and `connect-src` blocks it. But `strict-dynamic` with a nonce does not, and `unsafe-eval` can also let the attack through.

This is the same supply-chain lesson the industry keeps failing to learn. A compromised vendor script runs with the full trust of your site, and a policy that has been sitting unused is no help when that happens.

## Questions this post answers

### What was the OPTIMJACK attack that hit CNN, BBC and Zoom through Optimizely?

OPTIMJACK was a supply chain attack where malicious JavaScript was injected into Optimizely's customer-editable Project JavaScript field, loading a script from 1688360[.]cc/track.js. It hit 178 to 188 sites on November 16, 2026, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, and Peacock. The payload swapped crypto wallet addresses, stole card numbers, and loaded iOS exploit code on Apple devices.

_Teams auditing third-party script risk can track incidents like this one on daily.dev._

### Does a Content-Security-Policy stop malicious third-party JavaScript injected through a platform like Optimizely?

A strict script-src and connect-src Content-Security-Policy blocks this type of payload, but most sites lack one. Of 256 hosts tested after the OPTIMJACK attack, 68 had no CSP at all, 50 had a CSP that still allowed the payload and data theft, and only 24 (15%) actually blocked it. Settings like unsafe-eval, or strict-dynamic combined with a nonce, can also let the attack through.

_Developers hardening CSP configurations can follow writeups like this on daily.dev._

### How much money did the attackers steal in the Optimizely crypto clipper attack?

The attacker's crypto wallets received roughly $6,600 to $7,040, depending on how the transactions are counted. That figure is described as a rough floor rather than a firm total, since some of the received funds may predate this specific campaign.

_Security-conscious developers track emerging supply chain threats like this on daily.dev._

## Community take

How the wider developer community reacted, aggregated from 2 discussions and 115 comments across hackernews (as of 2026-11-17).

**TL;DR:** The dominant reaction is frustration that third-party tag-management/A-B-testing scripts like Optimizely's give unreviewed, constantly-changing code write access to huge sites, and that this keeps happening with no real accountability; CSP and SRI are discussed as partial, imperfect mitigations.

**Sentiment:** 2% positive · 28% mixed · 70% skeptical

**The case for**

- Some note CSP (even if imperfect) is one of the most meaningful tools developers have right now to reduce attack surface.
- A few point out server-side tagging reduces exposure by moving third-party calls server-to-server instead of client-side.

**The pushback**

- Loading third-party, frequently-changing JavaScript (analytics, A/B testing, marketing tags) fundamentally breaks a site's security model.
- SRI and hashing don't work well for these tools since vendors intentionally ship ever-changing script bundles.
- CSP is hard to maintain in practice because marketing teams add dozens of trackers that change monthly.
- There's no real accountability or liability for vendors or sites that serve malware this way, so incentives won't change.
- Optimizely specifically is criticized as a low-quality platform/recommending unsafe practices like 'unsafe-eval'.
- The underlying article itself is criticized as AI-generated 'slop' with vague, content-free sentences.

**By community**

- hackernews (heated): Heavy technical debate over CSP/SRI as mitigations mixed with broader anger at the ad-tech/marketing-script ecosystem, accountability, and criticism of both Optimizely and the article's writing quality.

**Hottest debate:** Whether failures like this should carry criminal/legal liability for vendors and sites, versus concerns that such liability would also criminalize good-faith open-source maintainers hit by supply-chain attacks.

**Open questions**

- What are the practical real-world effects on end users (e.g., were ordinary visitors actually compromised during normal use)?
- Why did Optimizely's systems fail to catch a change affecting hundreds of customers before it went live?

**Highlights**

> Yeah, honestly I wish they'd move that section higher up - it's probably he most genuinely useful tidbit in the article. As an aside - I'm rabidly against "analytics" companies that come in and suggest that the right "getting started" choice is to drop untrusted JS they own (and can update at any time) onto your site. It's "easy", but it completely breaks your security model. If I were a lawyer... I'd be taking a serious look at putting optimizely into the meat grinder for recommending 'unsafe-eval' as a script source... it literally has "unsafe" in the fucking name for a reason.  This alone should end the company.  It won't, because this space is absolutely FILLED with scummy behavior, but it should. --- A strict CSP is one of the most meaningful ways you have right now as a web developer to reduce attack surface.  People should take advantage of it. There's a reason browser vendors now force basically all extensions into a strict CSP by default... https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manif... They won't even let you manually relax it anymore.
> — [horsawlarway on hackernews · 1 comments](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50525855)

> This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability. In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same. I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs. How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
> — [mcoliver on hackernews](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50525683)

> It also makes adding csp a nightmare. Your marketing department is putting in 30 trackers, changing monthly. And then there’s different countries for end clients with different TLDs for connect-src. You can’t possibly get anything locked down enough. That’s bad for security when you rely on csp for mitigating other factors.
> — [goalieca on hackernews · 1 comments](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50525985)

> Just stop using JS... If you control the server why not have the vendor have a server level integtration that way you are not serving any remote scripts. It would be interesting to do a study on how many of these compromise emnate from third party scripts and I am willing to bet it is over 90%
> — [zenincognito on hackernews · 1 comments](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50525176)

> "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it." --Upton Sinclair
> — [blacksqr on hackernews](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50526466)

**Source threads**

- [hackernews](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50523300) · 164 points · 41 comments
- [hackernews](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50524767) · 128 points · 74 comments

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---

Tags: [#security](https://daily.dev/tags/security), [#cyber](https://daily.dev/tags/cyber), [#javascript](https://daily.dev/tags/javascript), [#cms](https://daily.dev/tags/cms)

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