--- title: OpenAPI React Query Codegen Compromised in Mini... description: Ten malicious versions of the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen were published on August 28, 2026, in a Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. The... canonical: https://daily.dev/posts/openapi-react-query-codegen-compromised-in-mini-shai-hulud-npm-supply-chain-attack-aar0hqr8j twitter:card: summary_large_image twitter:site: @dailydotdev og:type: website og:site_name: daily.dev og:title: OpenAPI React Query Codegen Compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack | daily.dev og:description: Ten malicious versions of the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen were published on August 28, 2026, in a Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. The... og:url: https://daily.dev/posts/openapi-react-query-codegen-compromised-in-mini-shai-hulud-npm-supply-chain-attack-aar0hqr8j og:image: https://api.daily.dev/og/posts/aaR0hqr8J.png og:image:alt: OpenAPI React Query Codegen Compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack og:image:width: 1200 og:image:height: 630 og:locale: en --- > ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://daily.dev/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # OpenAPI React Query Codegen Compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack **[Socket](https://daily.dev/sources/socketdev)** · 7 min read · 1 upvotes · 0 comments ## Summary Ten malicious versions of the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen were published on August 28, 2026, in a Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. The attacker exploited a comment-triggered GitHub Actions publishing workflow (triggered by commenting 'npm publish' on any pull request) to publish attacker-controlled code from a fork under the repository's trusted OIDC identity, producing valid npm provenance attestations despite the tarballs containing malware. The malicious code, delivered via binding.gyp or preinstall scripts, decrypts and runs a second-stage payload targeting cloud credentials, npm/GitHub tokens, and AI agent configs, with self-propagation behavior. At the time of writing, the npm 'latest' tag still resolved to a compromised version (3.0.4); known-good versions are 0.5.3, 1.6.2, 2.2.0, and 3.0.2. The report stresses that npm provenance and 'npm audit signatures' do not detect this attack since the workflow itself was legitimate but abused. ## Full article daily.dev links to this article rather than hosting it. Read it at the original source: ## Questions this post answers ### Which versions of @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen are compromised and what are the last known-good versions? Ten versions are compromised: 0.0.0-365d4eb738d3146583431948d3ba6e27a32556be, 0.0.0-ec7876d6c917dad516ba69bbfafc948b834bf0ab, 0.5.4, 0.5.5, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.0.3, and 3.0.4. The last known-good versions per release line are 0.5.3, 1.6.2, 2.2.0, and 3.0.2, and the npm 'latest' tag still points to the malicious 3.0.4. _Track active npm supply chain incidents like this one on daily.dev before pinning dependency versions._ ### Why doesn't npm provenance or npm audit signatures catch these malicious openapi-react-query-codegen packages? All ten malicious versions carry valid npm provenance attestations issued through GitHub Actions trusted publishing, using the same OIDC configuration as legitimate releases, so npm audit signatures does not flag them. Provenance only proves which workflow built an artifact, not that the workflow only builds trusted source code, because a comment-triggered publish workflow let an untrusted account publish forked code under the repo's identity. _Developers relying on npm provenance checks can follow supply chain security breakdowns like this on daily.dev._ ### How did attackers abuse a GitHub Actions comment-triggered publish workflow to compromise openapi-react-query-codegen? The release.yml workflow triggered on issue_comment events and published to npm whenever a comment said 'npm publish' on a pull request, without checking the commenter's repository association. This let any GitHub account check out a malicious fork's code and publish it under the repository's trusted OIDC identity with id-token: write permissions, while the resulting provenance still recorded the clean main branch commit. _Teams auditing CI publish workflows can find similar incident breakdowns on daily.dev to harden their pipelines._ ## Similar posts on daily.dev - [Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 317 npm Packages Compromised](https://daily.dev/posts/mini-shai-hulud-strikes-again-317-npm-packages-compromised-u2ptexbxr) · Hacker News · 2 upvotes · 0 comments - [New Shai-Hulud malware wave compromises 600 npm packages](https://daily.dev/posts/new-shai-hulud-malware-wave-compromises-600-npm-packages-fc6izpxyv) · BleepingComputer · 5 upvotes · 1 comments - [Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again. Mass npm Supply Chain Attack Hits the AntV Ecosystem](https://daily.dev/posts/shai-hulud-here-we-go-again-mass-npm-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-antv-ecosystem-nq51smsqn) · StepSecurity · 1 upvotes · 0 comments - [Mini Shai-Hulud Hits AntV: 300\+ Malicious npm Packages Published via Compromised Maintainer Account](https://daily.dev/posts/mini-shai-hulud-hits-antv-300-malicious-npm-packages-published-via-compromised-maintainer-account-kixznqqun) · Snyk · 0 upvotes · 0 comments --- Tags: [#security](https://daily.dev/tags/security), [#github-actions](https://daily.dev/tags/github-actions), [#npm](https://daily.dev/tags/npm), [#react-query](https://daily.dev/tags/react-query) [View this post on daily.dev](https://daily.dev/posts/openapi-react-query-codegen-compromised-in-mini-shai-hulud-npm-supply-chain-attack-aar0hqr8j) ```json {"@context":"https://schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https://daily.dev/#organization","name":"daily.dev","url":"https://daily.dev","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://daily.dev/apple-touch-icon.png","width":180,"height":180},"sameAs":["https://twitter.com/dailydotdev","https://github.com/dailydotdev","https://www.linkedin.com/company/daily-dev-ltd"]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https://daily.dev/#website","url":"https://daily.dev","name":"daily.dev","publisher":{"@id":"https://daily.dev/#organization"},"potentialAction":{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https://daily.dev/search?q={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}}]} {"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"TechArticle","headline":"OpenAPI React Query Codegen Compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack","url":"https://daily.dev/posts/openapi-react-query-codegen-compromised-in-mini-shai-hulud-npm-supply-chain-attack-aar0hqr8j","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://daily.dev/posts/openapi-react-query-codegen-compromised-in-mini-shai-hulud-npm-supply-chain-attack-aar0hqr8j"},"datePublished":"2026-08-28T22:53:19.069Z","dateModified":"2026-09-14T08:26:21.501Z","description":"Ten malicious versions of the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen were published on August 28, 2026, in a Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. 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