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title: Security Incident – BGP Hijacking | daily.dev
description: Virtualizor and Softaculous disclosed a BGP hijack of their 162.55.80.0/24 IP range, operated on Hetzner infrastructure, that ran in two waves between 28 and...
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og:title: Security Incident – BGP Hijacking | daily.dev
og:description: Virtualizor and Softaculous disclosed a BGP hijack of their 162.55.80.0/24 IP range, operated on Hetzner infrastructure, that ran in two waves between 28 and...
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# Security Incident – BGP Hijacking

**[Lobsters](https://daily.dev/sources/lobsters)** · 26 min read · 0 upvotes · 0 comments

## Summary

Virtualizor and Softaculous disclosed a BGP hijack of their 162.55.80.0/24 IP range, operated on Hetzner infrastructure, that ran in two waves between 28 and 30 August 2026, totaling roughly 33 hours. The attacker (via rogue network AS62390, NexonHost, routed through transit AS6204/Zet.net) obtained a valid Let's Encrypt TLS certificate for virtualizor.com, softaculous.com, and related domains, so victims saw no certificate warnings. A malicious Virtualizor update package was confirmed delivered to a small number of servers that checked for updates during diverted windows, since update clients did not yet cryptographically verify packages. Client-area/billing sessions on softaculous.com/clients may also have been diverted. The company published a detailed RIPE RIS-based measurement table showing up to 72% of peers diverted at peak, is invalidating client sessions, urges checking for a rogue systemd unit (java-jre-update.service), rotating API keys, auditing SSH access, and says it will add code signing for all update packages going forward.

## Full article

daily.dev links to this article rather than hosting it. Read it at the original source: <https://www.virtualizor.com/blog/security-incident-bgp-hijacking>

## Questions this post answers

### What happened in the Virtualizor and Softaculous BGP hijacking security incident?

Between 28 August 2026 20:57 UTC and 30 August 2026 06:10 UTC, network AS62390 (NexonHost) hijacked Hetzner's 162.55.80.0/24 block used by Softaculous and Virtualizor systems, routed via transit AS6204 (Zet.net). The attacker obtained a valid Let's Encrypt TLS certificate for the affected domains and delivered a malicious update package to a small number of Virtualizor installations that checked for updates during diverted intervals.

_Teams tracking infrastructure security incidents like BGP hijacks can follow the fallout on daily.dev._

### How do I check if my Virtualizor server was compromised by the BGP hijack update package attack?

Check for the indicator of compromise: a systemd unit at /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service, and a corresponding enabled or running java-jre-update service. If found, do not delete it, contact Virtualizor support instead so evidence can be preserved. Also rotate API keys, restrict API access to trusted IPs, and audit for unknown SSH keys or unexpected cron jobs.

_Ops engineers responding to server compromise indicators can track similar advisories on daily.dev._

### How widespread was the 2026 Hetzner 162.55.80.0/24 BGP hijack according to RIPE RIS data?

At peak, roughly 100% of RIS peers holding a route to the prefix were diverted, equal to about 72% of the full 368-peer RIS collector set, with a time-weighted average of about 28% of all peers diverted across the full 33.3-hour incident. All 368 RIPE RIS collector peers carried the hijacked route at some point, and about 10,600 route withdrawals were recorded due to flap dampening.

_Engineers evaluating the real-world scope of routing attacks can dig into incident data like this on daily.dev._

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---

Tags: [#cyber](https://daily.dev/tags/cyber)

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