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title: The $1.5B Blind Spot — And Why You’re Next | daily.dev
description: An analysis of the February 2025 Bybit hack, in which North Korea's Lazarus Group stole roughly $1.5 billion in ETH from a Safe (Gnosis Safe) multisig cold...
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og:title: The $1.5B Blind Spot — And Why You’re Next | daily.dev
og:description: An analysis of the February 2025 Bybit hack, in which North Korea's Lazarus Group stole roughly $1.5 billion in ETH from a Safe (Gnosis Safe) multisig cold...
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# The $1.5B Blind Spot — And Why You’re Next

**[Coins Bench](https://daily.dev/sources/coinsbench)** · 4 min read · 7 upvotes · 0 comments

## Summary

An analysis of the February 2025 Bybit hack, in which North Korea's Lazarus Group stole roughly $1.5 billion in ETH from a Safe (Gnosis Safe) multisig cold wallet secured with Ledger hardware wallets. Attackers compromised a Safe developer's macOS machine, hijacked AWS session tokens, and injected malicious JavaScript into Safe's frontend that only activated for Bybit's wallet addresses. The injected code silently swapped a routine transfer for a delegatecall that transferred wallet ownership and reduced required signatures to one, letting attackers drain funds in under 15 minutes while all three Ledger signers unknowingly approved it because their hardware wallets couldn't decode the malicious payload. The piece argues the core failure was that all signers trusted a single compromised UI, and recommends independent verification tools, better hardware wallet decoding, and time locks for contract upgrades.

## Full article

daily.dev links to this article rather than hosting it. Read it at the original source: <https://coinsbench.com/the-1-5b-blind-spot-and-why-youre-next-87310ac96a7f>

## Questions this post answers

### How did the Bybit $1.5 billion ETH hack actually work?

Attackers compromised a Safe{Wallet} developer's macOS machine via social engineering, hijacked their AWS session tokens, and injected malicious JavaScript into Safe's frontend that activated only for Bybit's wallet addresses. When Bybit initiated a routine transfer, the script silently substituted the payload with a delegatecall transferring wallet ownership to attacker addresses, which all three Ledger signers approved without realizing it.

_Teams securing wallet infrastructure follow deep dives on incidents like this through daily.dev._

### Why couldn't the Ledger hardware wallets stop the Bybit hack even with three-of-three multisig approval?

Ledger hardware wallets displayed structured data fields but could not decode what the transaction's delegatecall actually did, showing only a numeric operation parameter without meaningful context. Because all three signers relied on the same compromised Safe web interface, multisig collapsed from three-of-three security to effectively one-of-one, since deceiving the shared UI deceived every signer simultaneously.

_Developers evaluating multisig wallet security weigh tradeoffs like this on daily.dev._

### What is a delegatecall and why is it dangerous in multisig wallet exploits?

Delegatecall is an Ethereum smart contract mechanism that lets one contract execute code in the context of another's storage; in the Bybit hack, attackers used it to overwrite the list of authorized wallet signers and lower the required signature threshold to one. Once ownership changed via delegatecall, the attacker could drain all remaining assets unilaterally within minutes.

_Anyone auditing smart contract calls for risky patterns tracks writeups like this via daily.dev._

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---

Tags: [#crypto](https://daily.dev/tags/crypto)

[View this post on daily.dev](https://daily.dev/posts/the-1-5b-blind-spot-and-why-you-re-next-4zf39eghr)

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