The One Thing Every Smart Contract Auditor Misses

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A security auditor argues that smart contract audits focus too narrowly on code while missing the human and infrastructure weaknesses attackers actually exploit, such as blind signing, compromised frontends, and leaked AWS credentials. Citing the Radiant Capital and Bybit incidents as examples of the same attack pattern repeating, the piece proposes independent transaction verification through a second channel as a simple but underused fix, and lists five questions auditors should ask about infrastructure, signing processes, and incident response.

4m read timeFrom coinsbench.com
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Questions this post answers

What attack vector was used in the Bybit hack that resulted in a $1.5 billion loss?

Frontend poisoning combined with blind signing enabled the Bybit exploit. Signers saw one transaction displayed on their screen while their hardware wallets (Ledgers) actually signed a different, malicious transaction, allowing attackers to drain funds despite multi-sig protections being in place. Anyone tracking DeFi exploit patterns can follow security postmortems like this on daily.dev.

How can a DeFi protocol protect against frontend poisoning attacks on multi-sig transactions?

Independent verification through two separate channels can neutralize frontend poisoning. One channel is the standard signing interface (such as a Safe Wallet screen), which can be compromised, while a second independent tool reads the transaction directly from the blockchain and explains it in plain English, catching any discrepancy before signing. Teams hardening multi-sig workflows can find practical security approaches like this on daily.dev.

Why did the Radiant Capital hack happen despite the protocol having passed security audits?

Radiant Capital's entire infrastructure depended on a single developer's AWS session tokens, meaning that compromising one developer's cloud credentials was enough to bypass the protection multi-sig was supposed to provide. The 2024 breach, resulting in a $50 million loss, exploited this infrastructure weakness rather than a flaw in the smart contract code itself. Developers weighing infrastructure risk alongside code audits can track similar incidents on daily.dev.

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